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specify what "caring about" means, and why it is
important, and (c) in both ordinary usage and the
broader philosophical tradition captures a distinction
that is worth preserving.
R.G. Frey is perhaps the most familiar defender of
the position that animals cannot have desires. Although
he does not use terms like "care about," his conclusion
also entails that animals are incapable of caring about
things in the sense to be defmed below. His argument
can be summarized as follows:
P-I. In order for S to desire 0, S must have some
beliefs about O.
1'-2. Beliefs require the ability to entertain and
accept certain statements as true, and hence the
ability to draw a distinction between true and
false statements.
P-3.1be ability to draw a distinction between true
and false statements requires the use of
language, and some understanding of how
language represents states of affairs.
P-4. Animals lack the requisite linguistic abilities.
C. Therefore, animals lack beliefs, desires, and
interests. 3

I am going to argue for a thesis that almost nobody in
this audience would dispute: animals have things they
care about, and the fact that animals care about them
has moral significance. However, the lack of
disagreement (in this forum, at least) should not disguise
the fact that more work needs to be done, both to answer
a recent spate of attempts to deny the thesis and to clarify
exactly what "caring about" means, covers, and entails
for our moral theories.
It might be more natural to talk about animals'
interests, rather than what they care about. Unfortunately, this term has been interpreted in so many
different ways that its use invites confusion. On one
end of the spectrum, Tom Regan wants to allow for
both preference and welfare interests, where the latter
can involve things about which the subject knows or
understands nothing. 1 On the other end, R.G. Frey
associates "interests" with terms such as "wants" and
"desires," and further argues that these states require
a language. 2 Rather than try to dictate which of these
interpretations more nearly renects ordinary English
usage (a misguided project at bes!), I have chosen to
use a lenn which I hope (a) has less "baggage," at
least in the debate about animals, (b) will allow me to
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Although this argument is most closely associated
with Frey, it has been echoed by Michael Leahy.4 Both
agree, for example, that Regan's broader use of
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unambiguous enough terms. 9 If we interpret the issue
this way, we might be tempted to respond: "we can't
tell, but the cat can, and that's what matters." This would
beg the question: the charge is not simply that we cannot
properly identify the object of the cat's desire, but that
it cannot have any desires without a language in which
to express true and false propositions about that object.
l1le charge is that the cat lacks a medium in which to
refer to or represent the object of any belief or desire,
and hence cannot have beliefs and desires.
Contemporary philosophy provides a much more
effective response to this concern about the possibility
ofhaving an object of belief or desire. 10 l1le two salient
points for our purpose, in their most general form, are:
(1) any adequate psychological theory that hopes to
explain animal behavior will have to attribute to many
animals the ability to receive, encode, recall, and use
such information;ll and (2) there is no reason to think
that the medium in which the mind/brain encooes and
manipulates information is identical with the language
(if any) in which one communicates. Hence, the lack
of a natural language of communication does not
provide gocxl evidence against the hypothesis that a
bcing has a language of thought. And it is the
language of thought or something analogous to it,
not communication, that provides the basis for
propositional attitudes.
Ibe first of these very general ideas drawn from
contemporary philosophy of mind is an essential part
of a more general demonstration of why Behaviorism
simply won't work. Behaviorism simply has not been
able to give an adequate theory which explains the
behavior of (at least) birds and mammals simply in terms
of stimulus response and positive and negative
reinforcements; either because the salient features for
explaining the feature may not be present in the
environment at the time, or because the feature is not
one which can be captured in law-like statements about
the environment. 12 In marked contmst to the failures of
Behaviorism, theories that work inevitably postulate that
complex creatures can carry with them and access
illlemally stored information about the world.
l1lere are important disputes about the medium and
mechanisms required to store and use information:
does it have syntactic structure? how holistic is it? etc.
(Even, in Dennett's ca<;e: in what sense is it real?).l1le
relevant point of agreement for our purposes is that the
medium cannot be limited to natural languages such
as English. To do so (a) threatens to lead to an infinite

"interest" cannot be sufficient to establish moral
relevance, since Regan's concept of interests would,
according to them, entails that tractors as well as can
have "interests" in that sense.
Many animal scientists also reject talk of animals'
interests or desires or caring, usually preferring terms
such as "needs" which seem to them more quantifiable
and testable, hence more scientifically respectable. A
full defensc ofmy appeal to a concept of "caring about"
should address the scientific claim; also Carruthers's
arguments on this subject, and would explore some
reasons why Daniel Dennett's reeent account of
consciousness5 poses a very similar threat to talk of
animals' interests and caring. Although there will not
be time to do justice to these themes today, they do
indicate the range of serious challenges to the idea that
animals do have interests and care about things.
As I have already acknowledged, terms like
"interests" have a rather messy history, even within
the narrow confines of debates about animals. Very
roughly, wilh many intermediate possibilities lefl
aside, the two opposing interpretations of "s has an
interest in 0''6 would be:

"s [rationally?] desires 0," or
(2) "0 would enhance S's ability to fulfill its proper
function, role, or telos."

(I)

Sense (I) is the one that leads Frey, Carruthers,
and Leahy to reject the claim that animals can have
full-blown morally weighty interests. Again acknowledging the oversimplification, it would seem that for
all three, S's desiring 0 entails (a) that there is a way
of specifying, fixing, or correctly identifying the
object of 5's desire, and (b) that 5 has the capacity
to identify 0 and distinguish it from things that would
not satisfy the desire.
The perhaps surprising link with Dennett comes
primarily through condition (a), with (b) providing a
secondary connection. Although Dennett is generally
considered a supporter of cognitive ethology and its
references to the intentional mental states of animals, 7
his more recent championing of "heteropheIlOIIlOllology"
gives a special role to language in fixing the appropriate
ascription of intentional states. 8
A tempting, but probably misguided, response to
this argument is to treat it a<; a variant on the problem
of other minds: we can never get to the truth of what
the cat wants, because the cat can't tell us in
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regress of interpretations of linguistic signs, (b)
overlooks thc fact that a very large portion of cognitive
psychology works as well for animals that lack a naturnl
language (small humans as well as nonhumans) as it
does for adult language users, and (c) founders on the
question of how we can learn a language without the
prior ability to form hypotheses. Moreover, the inner
representations in this medium, whatever it is, can be
accurate or inaccurate, true or false, thus answering
another of Frey's concerns.
If the foregoing argument is correct, we have
explained how a being can have beliefs and desires
without having a language with which to communicate
descriptions about the objects of those inner states. Thus,
many animals can have beliefs and desires, and satisfy
the conditions set forth for having interests in a morally
relevant sense. 13 Moreover, tractors don't have these
sorts of inner states, and neither do paramecia. 14
However, we are not out of the woods yet: although
tractors and paramecia don't have desires (because they
don't have mental representations), computers might
well, and it would certainly disturb our rellective
equilibrium to find our moral theory generating direct
duties to our PC's.
This is where "caring about" becomes relevant. At
least none of the current crop of artificial life cares about
whcther it gets what it wants. IS I wish to claim that we
can identify a sense of "caring about" such that many
animals typically do care about getting what they desire,
but (at least the current generation of) computers do
not. In order to justify that claim, we will have to unpack
the notion of caring.
I propose to do this via an indirect approach: by
asking if/how we might be justified in saying that one
animal is happier or more contented than another. If
animal scientists read this paper, they will certainly
either cringe or fume at the sloppy, untestable
language, but that is exactly why I chose these terms.
Despite their lack of direct physiological or behavioral
correlates or indicators (or "operant definitions"),
terms like "happy" and "content" do have a justifiable
place in the scientific study of animals, and they also
provide a clearer foundation for investigating what
animals care about.
TIle rust thing any self-respecting animal scientist
would do at tllis point is to ask what I mean by "happy,"
trying to raise the suspicion that there is no real state to
be relied on here. The [ust thing any self-respecting
philosopher would respond is that the demand for
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necessary and sufficient conditions was well buried with
logical positivism; although we sometimes can and
ought to offcr such conditions, they arc not always
necessary for knowledge or respectable science. The
undeniable fact is that experienced observers can tell
quite well when an animal is happy.
On the one hand, books about dog training,
horseback riding, animal husbandry of all sorts, are
filled with statements like: any good dog owner
(dairyman, rider, etc.) can tell whether an animal is
happy, fearful, bored, or irritated. On the other hand, at
some point in almost any discussion of the treatment
of farm or laboratory animal, someone inevitably raises
the challenge: "But you can't really give us hard
seientific data about how to tell whether an animal is
happy, can youT' This challenge may be followed witb
the assertion liat it is lierefore wrong to demand tbat
we act as if a severely confined animal is unhappy
(since we don't know for sure liat he is), or even the
charge that one is committing the eighth deadly sin:
antluopomorphism.
The answer to this challenge lies in some fairly
straightforward epistemology. On the assumption tbat
we can set aside extreme skepticism (which would mean
we would have to doubt not only the mental life but lie
physical existence of the sow and her crate, as well as
the mental lives of fellow humans), there are two widely
recognized reliable indications that we know what we
arc talking about, and that we are describing something
real about the world.
The first way to convince you that I know what I'm
talking about, that I'm saying something true, is to
describe to you a general scientific theory and
methodology that allows us to explain, predict, and
understand in a fairly deep way, what is going on. If
you ask me why stones roll downhill, and I glibly assure
you that "it's because of gravity," you probably should
probe to see whether I can back up my assertion in this
sort of way. You might find out that I know no more
about gravity than a nineteentb century biologist who
blithely tells us liat we move because of our elan vital.
This, of course, is tbe ultimate aim of science. We want
to know not only what happens, but why it happens. As
a result of a better understanding of why tbings happen,
I often also get better at predicting and identifying what
happens: as a result of understanding. In the case of
happiness, this approach does not look very promising.
However, we often do remarkably well even in the
absence of such deep explanatory theories, and we do
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so without lapsing into "subjectivity." All of us, to some
extent, and some of us to an astounding extent, can
recognize features of the world without being able to
spell out in any detailed way how we do so. lIere are
some examples: I 6

claims, and given that we have such a situation with
reports about whether animals are happy, content, upset,
etc., I conclude that we are justified in accepting those
reports as descriptions of animals' actual states. Having
done so, we are ready to return to the topic ofcaring about.
Having argued that we can talk about an animal's
being happy or unhappy, and make reliable judgments
about such states, I now propose to define what Scares
about in terms of what makes S happy (or less unhappy)
in Ihe following manner:

(I) Chicken sexers.
(2) SAT evaluators and others who grade "standardized" essay exams.
(3) Chess players who recognize significant patterns.
(4) Any competent English speaker judging the
grammaticality of sentences.

Scares about 0 itS directly desires 0,17 and getting
or achieving 0 contributes to S's happiness.

The objectivity in such cases is established in two
ways. First, predictive success: the success rate of the
chicken sexer can be determined quite easily, and good
pattern recognizers will win more chess games. Second,
where the observers are in fact picking out something
that is really there, we find a high degree of intersubjective agreement, at least among skilled, trained,
experienced practitioners. These two features provide
good epistemic warrant for believing that observers are
accurately detecting an objective feature of the world,
something that is really "out there." Both features can
often be found in judgments about an animal's
emotional and mental states.
Predictive success in judging an animal's inner
states, including happiness, comes down to whether we
can interact as we want to with animals: they do what
we want, don't attack us, settle down calmly, thrive
without developing "vices," and so on. That's why
books on dog training and horseback riding are so filled
with talk about the need to recognize when an animals
is happy or contented. Learning to recognize these states
increases one's success at working well with the animal.
Intersubjective agreement (assuming objective,
knowledgeable observers) is less obvious in the case
of animal happiness because heavily influenced by
preconceptions and the fact Ihat we have been taught
to talk about animals in more "rigorous" and "scientific"
ways. However, if we focus on people who work and
live with animals, the intersubjective agreement soon
becomes apparent. Good dog handlers will usually agree
about whether a dog is enjoying herself; two shepherds
will pick out the same ewe as the one who is
uncomfortable; and so on.
Given that reports by observers with a high degree
ofpredictive success and intersubjective agreement are
perfectly respectable sources of objective knowledge
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This definition entails that getting (or being denied)
what she cares about makes a difference to the general
state of S's experienced well-being. It also allows for
varying intensity of caring: some things will matter
more than others. Finally, this definition entails that we
can be mistaken about what we care about: we can think
we care about something, only to discover that we were
wrong: when we achieve it, we discover that it does
not make us happy. These features combine to delineate
a real phenomenon in many humans and many animals.
The resulting definition accord~ well with our ordinary
concept of caring about, and helps explain why the
objects of caring carry moral significance in a way that
more neutral interests may not.
Let me emphasize that I am not claiming that we
care about things because they contribute to our
happiness; we may sometimes do so, but we may have
all sorts of other reasons for caring about something.
Rather, I am suggesting that a hallmark, a definitive
criterion of what we care about (as opposed to what we
think we care about) is that it contributes to our
happiness or alleviates our unhappiness.
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to
otTer a complete axiology and to locate "what we care
about" in that framework. However, at the very least,
the sort of interests highlighted in this new vocabulary
of "caring about" carry more prima facie moral weight
than things that are merely "good for" some being. If
one is a preference utilitarian, for example, caring about
is a more obvious manifestation of preference than
interests in any weaker sense. From a deontological
perspective. paying due attention to what a being cares
about seems an appropriate way of respecting the
individual as a source of valuing, wilhout reducing him/
her to a mere contributor to the general good. In any
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event the values highlighted by what we carc about will
be hard to ignore in an adequate moral theory.
In this paper, I have argued for two theses. 11le fIrst
is that arguments such as Frey's and Leahy's fail to
establish that animals do not have interests in a morally
relevant sense. 11le second is that we can identify the
relevant sense of interests, and at least begin to illustrate
its moral relevance, by focusing on the question of what
animals care about. There is much more to be said on
this topic, of course. The critical side of my argument
must be extended to respond more specillcally to other
skeptics, such as Davidson and Carruthers, and potential
skeptics such as Dennett. More work also remains to
be done to establish the exact role in our moral theory
of what beings care about. However, we have made
significant progress in both these directions.

9 I say "probably" for two reasons. First, this may be
what some nonphilosophers are worried about. Second, at
least in discussion, some of Frey's responses seem to move
in this direction,
10 Although I will present the view in terminology most
closely associated with Jerry Fodor's "language of thought,"
nothing in what I say here implies a commitment to Fodor's
rejection of connectionism. Any theory which posits a method
of encoding or representing information about the environment, including non-eliminativist versions of connectionism,
will support the same conclusion. The two reasons presented
in the text arc purposely presented as claims that would be
accepted by almost any plausible non-eliminativist account
of cognitive states.

11 To forestall the inevitable "how far down do you go?"
reply, let me point out that these systems can vary in
complexity. ranging from highly abstract and complex to so
simple as to no longer count as a "language of thought." For
more details, see Jerry Fodor, "Why Paramecia Don't Have
Mental Representations." Midwest Studies in Philosophy, v.
X: Pbilosophy of Mind. French and Uehling (eds),
Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1986, pp. 3-23.
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17 "Directly desire" does not mean "desire for its own
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at, as opposed to things which are essential to one or more of
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best be an indirect desire.
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particular animals mayor may not care about. So, now

Response:

I will consider what sorts of things my cats care about.
I decided to adopt a pair of kittens about four years
ago, I thought it better to have two cats rather than one
since I believed that a solitary cat would be less happy
than a cat with a playmate. I agree with Russow that
using words like "happy" and "content" to describe
nonhuman animal behavior is, though scientifically
unmeasurable, still philosophically justifiable. When I
went to the Omaha Humane Society to see a litter of
six-week-old kittens they had told me about over the
phone, I was shown a litter of four kittens, three females
and a male. Since I thought I could not easily manage
four growing cats, I decided to adopt the three females
while hoping that someone else would adopt the male.
Thus, my fIrst decision was to separate the orphaned
siblings. Did the three sisters care about being separated
from their brother? All four kittens were mewing loudly
at the time, which I interpreted as distress, but perhaps
their distress was due to their uncomfortable surroundings
at the Humane Society or the previous loss of their
mother, and not their separation from their brother.
Soon after bringing the three kittens home, I tried
to put small collars with their identification tags on
them. They reacted by (frantically'!) leaping about,
arching their necks, and struggling to pull the collars
off with their paws. I inferred from this behavior that
they didn't much care for the collars, and so I promptly
removed them. A week or two later, one of the kittens
began to have diarIbea My veterinarian diagnosed her
as suffering from a gastro-intestinal infection, and he
supplied me with medicine for her. Sadly, the
medication failed to cure her ailment. Despite my
efforts, she stopped eating entirely, became very weak
in a short time, and died on a Sunday evening before I
could take her to the vet the next morning. Had the
unfortunate kitten stopped caring about food? Hours
before she died, her two sisters huddled with her just
a<; they had often done before when all three were
healthy. Did the two surviving kittens care about their
sister dying? I could not judge either way from their
behavior since they neither attended closely to the dead
kitten nor avoided it in any obvious way. They simply
seemed to ignore it.
As is usually the case, the two cats, Bryseis and
Chryseis, developed quite distinct personalities. Bryscis,
the more athletic cat, exhibits a strong interest in
exploring the basement, going outside, and drinking
from sinks, the toilet, and the tub. Chryseis, in contrast,

Straying and Spaying:
What Do Cats Care About?
William O. Stephens
Creighton University
In her paper, "What Do Animals Care About?," LillyMarlene Russow argues for two theses. The first is that
the arguments of Frey and Leahy fail to establish that
animals do not have interests in a morally relevant sense.
I think she is successful in defending this thesis. Less
convincing is her second thesis, namely, that we are
better off focusing on the question of what animals
care about than continuing to speak of the interests
that animals have. While Russow's criticisms of
behaviorism are persuasive, she offers no compelling
grounds to accept her suggestion that computers might
well have desires. Since computers lack nervous
systems and are not conative organisms, it seems
implausible to think they have desires. Russow is also
too casual in assuming that we can simply set a<;ide
extreme skepticism. She gives no hint of how this can
be done in a philosophically adequate way. But the main
question I want to focus on is: What do specific
nonhuman animals specifically care about?
Let me begin by reflecting in some detail on
Russow's claim that "The undeniable fact is that
experienced observers can tell quite well when an
animal is happy." I am trained as a professional
philosopher and not as a professional cat-handler, but I
do fancy myself an experienced observer of feline
behavior since I have lived with two cats for about
thirteen years of my life. I think that for any
investigation of what animals care about, it is important
to address specific, concrete examples of what
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seems not to care about the ha'iement, the out-of-doors,
or drinking from places other than her water bowl;
Chryseis cares much more about being fed canned rather
than dry cat food. Do I have a moral obligation to let
Dryseis go outside? Making them wear collars as kittens
seemed to make them quite unhappy. So, since Dryseis
still remains collarless and untagged, I am reluctant to
let her become an "outdoor" cat. If I allowed her to
roam free in my neighborhood, I would expose her to
the risk of fights with other animals, serious injury, or
evcn death from being struck by an automobilc. Am I
justified in seriously restricting her liberty as I do?
Cats are predators, after all, and her telos as a cat
certainly includes sniffmg outdoor scents, stalking birds,
chasing insects, and hunting small herbivores.
Therefore, she might well be more content freely
exploring the outdoor environment for hours every day
than staying indoors all but a few minutes every week
when I closely supervise her limited excursions
outdoors. Does Bryseis care about living a long, safe
life indoors? Or would she be much happier roaming
the neighborhood unimpeded by my paternalistic,
protectionist interference? Would she return home if I
let her outside on her own? And if she did not, would
she be happier as a stray? How am I to interpret her
behavior so as reasonably to judge what would make
her happiest? Would there be, to use Russow's words,
"a high degree of intersubjectivc agreement, at least
among skilled, trained, experienced practitioners" about
what would most contribute to Bryseis' happiness?
Consider another behavior. My cats have developed
the all too common "vice" of clawing the furniture,
despite my conscientious efforts to trim their claws
regularly. If I decided never to allow them outside on
their own, then they would never need their claws to
defend themselves from attack by hostile animals. Do
cats care about being declawed?
Another element of the telos of cats is surely to
reproduce. Do female cats care about being spayed?
Are feline mothers who nurture kiuens happier than
their spayed sisters? Do male cats care about being
neutered? Are promiscuous tomcats happier than their
neutered, more docile brothers'? Or do we have a
paternalistic justification for spaying and neutering dogs
and cats in order to minimize the number, and the usual
suffering, of strays?
Russow suggests that "a definitive criterion of what
we care about (as opposed to what we think we care
about) is that it contributes to our happiness Of alleviates
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our unhappiness." Given the behavior my cats exhibit
when I am away from home for long periods of time,
surely they would be happier, and not just think
themselves happier, were I to spend more time at home
with them. Does this suffice to establish that I have a
pri11Ul facie duty to spend more time at home with my
cats'? Russow proposes the following definition: "5
cares about 0 if and only if S directly desires 0, and
getting or achieving 0 contributes to 5's happiness."
This definition secms inadequate for two reasons.
First, while it may seem to capture our ordinary concept
of caring about inanimate objects, I think it fails to
describe our ordinary concept of caring about other
sentient subjects. Many humans, and perhaps many
intelligent nonhuman animals as well, care about other
sentient beings for their own sakes, and not only because
the company of those subjects contributes to the
happiness of the individual who is doing the caring. I
offer the following definition of intersubjective caring:
S 1 cares about 52 if and only if S 1 desires to
promote the happiness or well-being of S2'
whether SI and 52 are conspecifics or sentient
beings of different species.
Let us return to my stock example. Do my cats care
about each other (and me) in the same sort of way that
they care about being fed canned cat food and having a
clean litterbox? If so, then when they play with each
other they care about each other the same sort of way
they care about a paper clip or a pair of socks when
they play with these things. I am not inclined to construe
their caring about each other so narrowly. They exhibit
reciprocal altruism when they groom each other. Such
reciprocal altruism suggests to me that they may well
care about each other's well-being to some extent. That
is, Bryseis may well care about the subject Chryseis,
an individual with her own well-being, rather than
merely caring about the object Chryseis, a thing that
contributes to Bryseis' happiness.
The second reason to hesitate accepting Russow's
definition of "caring about" is that she is imposing it as
a stipulative definition that does not, in fact, "accord
well with our ordinary concept of caring about" even
when "0" refers exclusively to objects. For example, I
could on some occasion care about having some
cheesecake. Later, after I find and eat a piece of
cheesecake, I could well discover that having it did not
make me happy but, rather, made me sad for failing to
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keep to my diet. It would be wrong to say in retrospect
that I didn't really care about having the cheesecake in
the first place. Rather, we should say I no longer care
about having more cheesecake because, having
committed dietary sin, I now care more about returning
to my diet. In short, I do not see how Russow's
distinction between "caring about" and "thinking we
care about" does more work than the distinction between
"taking an interest in" and "successfully promoting
one's self-interest." To say that smokers take an interest
in smoking, but smoking is not really in their selfinterest, strikes me as more in accord with our ordinary
concepts than saying that smokers think they care about
smoking, but do not really care, since smoking does
not contribute to their long-term happiness. Similarly,
to say that my cat Bryseis takes an interest in roaming
free outside, but roaming free outside is not really in
her self-interest, makes more sense to me than to say
that Bryseis thinks she cares about roaming free outside,
but she does not really care, since it probably endangers
her long-term happiness.
Russow has made a decent attempt to advance the
discussion of how best to talk about animals' interests,
desires, and happiness. However, her proposed
defmition of "caring about" fails to mark the qualitative
difference between caring about an object and caring
about a subject and docs not, in fact, accord well with
our ordinary concept of caring about generally.
Moreover, since Russow's discussion is deficient at the
theoretical level on these points, its application to
questions about specific animals-for example, whether
housecats care about being allowed to stray outside,
being spayed or neutered, etC.-is not promising.

Reply
Lilly-Marlene Russow
Purdue University
I could respond by answering Professor Stephens'
specific questions about his cats: either offering a
judgment about what they do and don't care about, or
explaining what one would do to determine that But
that would fill up all the remaining time, and miss his
deeper concerns. Instead, I'll say just a few words about
two more general concerns that he raises, either
explicitly or implicitly:
(1) how we can determine the object of intentional

states, including caring, and
(2) why "caring about" is an improvement over talk
about interests.
I take it that the philosophical issue underlying
Stephens' questions about what his cats care about in
specific incidents is the concern that there may be no
legitimate way of answering these questions. The full
answer to his concern would be too complicated to lay
out in detail-not because he's asking about cat." but
because specifying the object of any mental state is a
complicated business. Nonetheless, I'll try to indicate
some of the factors that should be involved.
First, sometimes de re specifications ofmental states
are the most appropriate ones. That is to say, we can
say that Chryseis believes of Stephens that he is a source
of food, without claiming or being committed to
anything about how he is "represented." The same is
true of other propositional attitudes, especially caring
about. 'Ibus, it is certainly reasonable, and perhaps even
necessary, at times to read "Chryseis cares about
Stephens" as a de re attitude.
Even if there is good reason to demand a de diclO
account of a mental state, there still may be good
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reason to suspect that we may not be able to specify
the content of the state in English. First, the concepts
of an individual who does not use or know English
may well be different in important ways from those
easily expressible in English. Indeed, given the
anti-Fregean moves in contemporary philosophy of
language, the so-called "narrow content" of a state may
not be properly expressible in any public language.
Second, when we are concerned specifically with
caring about, rather than just any mental state, we are
apt to conflate questions about how to specify the
object of the state with the more practical issue: what
would count as an adequate substitute for what is cared
about, what would make the subject happy in the same
sort of way. Thus, when we ask whether a cat really
cares about her dead companion, we may really be
trying to figure out whether introducing a new kitten
would "make things right again."
As I said, these remarks only touch the surface of
questions about fixing and describing the objects of
care, but I hope they are in keeping with my original
suggestion: current developments in philosophy of
mind can help us develop a more sophisticated and
more accurate way of thinking about the objects of
mental states.
The second issue I want to address is the proper
understanding of "care." I have proposed to analyze
"caring about" in terms of two factors: desire and
happiness. Thus, we can say about cats who want go
outside: they might desire to roam, but would be happier
staying inside, even though they don't realize that. The
question of how we should interpret a eat's behavior in
order "to judge what would make her happiest" is
misleading: the cat's current behavior is often not the
sole or even most important data about what will make
her happy. Since the second condition in our definition
of "caring about" refers to the future, it is possible for x
to be such that it will make one happy, and thus it is
possible for someone to care about x, but not know that
x will make her happy, and hence not know that she
cares about x. This state of affairs is even more likely
to occur with nonhuman animals than with normal,
adult, language using humans. It is also relevant to
cases such as SiCphens' cheesecake example: if eating
the cheesecake did not, in fact, contribute to his
happiness (Le., he eats the cheesecake and is no
happier afterwards-perhaps even feels disappointed),
I would argue that, even though he wanted or desired
the cheesecake, he was simply mistaken in thinking
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that he cared about it. If we tell the story slightly
differently (eating one small slice of cake made him
happy, given that he was able to return to his diet), then
we should conclude that he cares about eating
cheesecake in moderation.
Proper attention to the details of my proposal is also
relevant to Stephens' suggestion that my proposed
analysis of caring fails to do justice to caring for other
subjects. I explicit denied the claim that we care about
things because they contribute to our happiness. If we
avoid that mistake, I fail to see how caring for other
subjects falls outside my account.
I can only briefly mention two other points
Stephens brings up. First, docs the fact that Scares
about x engender a prima facie duty to ensure that S
obtains x? The short anSwer is that my account was not
intended to give a complete answer, although I will point
out that we do hold people morally culpable for
neglecting animals for whom they are responsible.
Second, he objects to my claim that computers might
have desires on the grounds that they don't have nervous
systems. This seems to me to beg the question against
artificial intelligence in particular, and functionalist
accounts of mind in general.
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